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I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 19, 1969, two photographers (Rolfe Christopher, 
a former aerial photographer for the U.S. Navy during World 
War II, and his son, Gary) flew over a manufacturing plant in 
Texas that was then under construction and took photographs of 
the plant.1 Upon seeing a plane circling its construction site, E.I. 
du Pont deNemours & Co., Inc. (DuPont) brought a lawsuit for 
trade secret misappropriation under Texas common law alleging 
that the actions of the defendants constituted the acquisition of 
trade secrets by “improper means.”2 At the time, there was no 
                                                          
© 2018 Sharon K. Sandeen 
 +  This is a draft chapter. The final version will be available in Research 
Handbook on Intellectual Property and Digital Technologies as part of the 
Edward Elgar Research Handbooks in IP series, Tanya Aplin editor, 
forthcoming 2018, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. The material cannot be used 
for any other purpose without further permission of the publisher, and is for 
private use only. 
 *  Robins Kaplan LLP Distinguished Professor in Intellectual Property 
Law and Director of the IP Institute at Mitchell Hamline School of Law. 
Professor Sandeen is grateful for the work of her Research Assistants, Cara 
Moulton and Yolanda Wilson, on this project and for the research support of 
Mitchell Hamline School of Law. 
 1. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 
1970), cert denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971). 
 2. Id. 
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recognized trade secret claim for the improper acquisition of 
trade secrets not followed by a disclosure or use of the trade 
secrets,3 nor a well-used claim for the wrongful acquisition of 
business information not constituting trade secrets (often 
referred to as confidential and proprietary information). To the 
contrary, two key facts of E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. 
Christopher (hereinafter Christopher) were that: (1) the plaintiff 
owned protectable information in the form of trade secrets; and 
(2) the defendants either disclosed or threatened to disclose 
those trade secrets to the unidentified third-party who hired 
them to take the photographs.4 
While Christopher is famous for holding that the “improper 
means” used to acquire trade secrets need not constitute “a 
trespass, other illegal conduct, or breach of a confidential 
relationship”5 (at least in Texas) it did not answer three 
questions that are central to any attempt to use tort law 
(including trade secret law) to combat the wrongful acquisition 
of information through cyber-hacking or other means. First, if 
the information that is acquired is not subsequently disclosed or 
used, what is the cognizable harm to the information owner?6 
Second, what if the information that was taken does not 
constitute a protectable “property” interest, for instance, by 
qualifying for trade secret protection?7 Relatedly, given the 
strong public policy in the United States and elsewhere that 
favors the dissemination of information, particularly 
information that is a part of the public domain, is it advisable to 
                                                          
 3. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 40 cmt. b (AM. 
LAW INST. 1995); ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS, § 1.01 
(2017) (citations omitted). 
 4. Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1013–14. 
 5. Id. at 1014; see also David S Levine, Schoolboy’s Tricks: Reasonable 
Cybersecurity and the Panic of Law Creation, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 
323, 332 (2015). 
 6. See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 308 (Cal. 2003) (emphasizing 
the need for provable harm for most torts and finding no harm to support a 
trespass to chattel claim regarding the misuse of Intel’s computer system). 
 7. Cf. Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Ent., Inc., 782 F. Supp. 2d 911, 960–61 (C.D. 
Cal. 2011) (discussing the inability to prevail on a trade secret misappropriation 
counter-claim if one cannot prove a protectable property interest through 
proving something is a trade secret). The under-developed common law tort of 
“misappropriation” also typically requires an identifiable property interest. See, 
e.g., Hollywood Screentest of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 151 Cal. App. 4th 
631 (2007). 
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create a broad wrongful acquisition tort to protect all types of 
information? 
Since the advent of the personal computer and the internet, 
and the concomitant increase in the risk of computer hacking, 
policymakers have struggled with how to address the acquisition 
of information by means that are deemed (or seem) improper. In 
the United States, for instance, the federal law known as the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) was adopted in 1986 to 
address,8 among other things, the wrongful access to and 
wrongful acquisition of information from a “protected 
computer.”9 In 1996, the European Union (EU) adopted a 
Database Directive that gives “the maker of a database” a sui 
generis right to protect databases in which they made “a 
substantial investment.”10 More recently, the United States 
enacted the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA),11 and the 
EU adopted a Trade Secret Directive for the stated purpose of 
combatting the misappropriation of trade secret information.12 
In designing these laws, policymakers skirted the questions 
posed above by statutorily: (1) defining the interests to be 
protected;13 (2) identifying cognizable harm to include, at least, 
threatened disclosure or use;14 and (3) specifying a private right 
of action and remedies.15 But none of these laws answer the 
questions left unresolved by Christopher with respect to the 
common law development (or lack thereof) of a wrongful 
acquisition tort which, at best, seems to have come “out of thin 
air” based upon the unique facts of Christopher. 
The analysis undertaken in this chapter was prompted by 
two puzzles. First, since U.S. trade secret law was developed 
                                                          
 8. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
474, 100 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)). 
 9. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2) (2012). 
 10. Directive 96/9, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20, 25 (EC) 
[hereinafter Database Directive]. 
 11. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, § 1890, 130 Stat. 
376 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1832–1833, 1835–1836, 1838–1839). 
 12. Directive 2016/943, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 
June 2016 on the Protection of Undisclosed Know-How and Business 
Information (Trade Secrets) Against Their Unlawful Acquisition, Use and 
Disclosure, 2016 O.J. (L 157) 1 (EU) [hereinafter Trade Secret Directive]. 
 13. See, e.g., Database Directive, supra note 10, arts. 2, 3, 7. 
 14. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4) (2012). 
 15. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (2012); Database Directive, supra note 10, 
art. 12. 
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based upon the breach of confidence law of England,16 and the 
law of England does not recognize an acquisition by improper 
means theory of recovery except in rare and nascent 
circumstances,17 how and why did such a theory develop in the 
United States? Second, to the extent the acquisition by improper 
means prong of U.S. trade secret law (unlike its counterpart in 
England) is disconnected from a duty of confidence and should 
be thought of as a separate tort,18 what are its elements, 
including the definition of cognizable harm? These questions are 
important not only for an understanding of trade secret law in 
the United States,19 but also for the implementation of the EU 
Trade Secret Directive which borrows from U.S. law to include 
the “acquisition by improper means” prong of U.S trade secret 
law.20 They also relate to the debate concerning the harms 
caused by data breaches and whether the mere taking or misuse 
of personal information, like credit information, is a cognizable 
“injury-in-fact” under U.S. law.21 
This chapter proceeds in three parts. First, based upon 
historical research, it examines how the “acquisition by 
improper means” prong of U.S. trade secret law developed and 
how it became disconnected from the requirement of a 
subsequent disclosure or use of the trade secrets.22 This analysis 
begins in Section II with an overview of the laws of the United 
States that protect information. In Section III, the history of the 
“acquisition by improper means” prong of trade secret 
misappropriation is discussed, showing that it is 
undertheorized, particularly when the alleged wrongful 
                                                          
 16. See BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RES. SERV., PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS: 
OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LAW AND LEGISLATION 5 (2016) (discussing the 
historical development of trade secret law). 
 17. Some recent English cases have provided relief in wrongful acquisition 
situations involving rights of privacy by finding that a duty of confidence arose 
from the wrongful acquisition. See, e.g., Tchenguiz v. Imerman, [2010] ECWA 
Civ 908. This, however, is different from finding a stand-alone wrongful 
acquisition claim not based upon a breach of confidence which, only in the last 
few years, has begun to emerge in England. See Google v. Vidal Hall, [2015] 
EWCA Civ 311. 
 18. See MILGRIM, supra note 3, § 1.01 (discussing the prongs for liability for 
disclosure or use of another’s trade secret). 
 19. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1832–1833, 1835–1836, 1838–1839. 
 20. Trade Secret Directive, supra note 12. 
 21. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016). 
 22. See MILGRIM, supra note 3 (discussing the development of trade secret 
law in the United States). 
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acquisition is not connected to a duty of confidence or a 
subsequent disclosure or use of trade secrets.23 Third, in Section 
IV, the pros and cons of recognizing a separate wrongful 
acquisition tort are discussed, including observations concerning 
the inability of trade secret law to address all incidents of cyber-
hacking and how a standalone wrongful acquisition tort might 
be designed.24 
II. SUMMARY OF INFORMATION LAW 
With the increase in accusations and incidents of “leaking,” 
“hacking,” and “spying,” including cyber-hacking,25 the law 
governing the protection of information has taken on greater 
importance, requiring an understanding of the types of 
information that can be protected and the nature of cognizable 
harms related to information.26 This is particularly true with 
respect to “non-confidential” and “public” information because 
the policy in the United States (and many other countries)27 is 
that information is not protected except in limited 
circumstances, and once information is made public it is free for 
anyone to use.28 As has been repeatedly stated by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, all ideas and information in general circulation 
are dedicated to the common good unless protected by applicable 
(but limited) intellectual property rights.29 As Justice O’Connor 
explained with respect to U.S. patent law: “From their inception, 
the federal patent laws have embodied a careful balance between 
                                                          
 23. See id. § 15.01 (discussing how the great preponderance of cases involve 
a breach of duty of confidence). 
 24. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, §§ 4–5 (discussing how companies 
are increasing measures to combat hacking and how the current state of trade 
secret law is ineffective). 
 25. Id. § 3 (discussing the increased risk of trade secret misappropriation). 
 26. See generally Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (discussing the need for 
strengthening trade secret law). 
 27. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19 (declaring that 
freedom of information includes the right “to receive and impart information”); 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 11.1 (stating that 
the right to freedom of expression includes the right “to receive and impart 
information without interference by public authorities”). 
 28. See MILGRIM, supra note 3, § 15.01 (discussing how matters of public 
knowledge are not protectable). 
 29. See e.g., Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 328–32 (2012); Bonito Boats, 
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989); Kewanee Oil Co. v. 
Bicron Corp. 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS 
§ 757 cmt. b (1939). 
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the need to promote innovation and the recognition that 
imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary 
to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive 
economy.”30 This same sentiment explains the limited scope of 
all laws that protect information and why trade secret protection 
in the United States is designed so as not to interfere with the 
disclosure purpose of patent law.31 Thus, the desire to protect 
information and databases, even against acts of wrongful 
acquisition, must always be balanced against the essential role 
that information plays in creating knowledge and the conditions 
for innovation and competition.32 
Based upon existing law in the United States and 
elsewhere, there are currently five (perhaps six) limited means 
to protect information, each providing varying degrees of 
protection. First, certain types of information may be protected 
by patent and copyright laws, but only for a limited time and 
with respect to certain types of uses or wrongs.33 Second, if 
information qualifies as “personal information,” it may be 
protected by applicable privacy and data protection laws.34 
Third, if information meets the legal definition of a trade secret 
then it might be protected against “misappropriation,”35 but 
trade secret protection ends when the information becomes 
generally known or readily ascertainable.36 Fourth, an 
information owner might protect its confidential information 
pursuant to contract law, but usually contract law cannot be 
                                                          
 30. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See generally Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, §§ 2–5 (discussing how 
companies desire to protect information and databases, and discussing the 
trade-off between patent protection and trade secret protection). 
 33. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). 
 34. E.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012); Freedom of 
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5) (2012) (stating that a “system of records” 
includes any records under the control of any agency from which information is 
retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying signature that is 
assigned to the individual); Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 
1681b(a) (2012) (stating that any consumer reporting agency may furnish a 
consumer report only under a set of specific limitations). 
 35. For information on the definition of a “trade secret,” see 18 U.S.C. § 
1839(3) (2012) which states a “trade secret” has three parts: (1) information; (2) 
reasonable measures taken to protect the information; and (3) which derives 
independent economic value from not being publicly known. See also MILGRIM, 
supra note 3, § 4.02. 
 36. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B); see also Coco v. A.N. Clark (Eng’rs) Ltd., 
[1968] F.S.R. 415 (U.K.) (detailing English breach of confidence claim elements). 
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used to protect non-confidential information or to designate 
information as protectable trade secrets, and it usually does not 
apply to third-parties to the contract.37 Fifth, some statutes 
provide sui generis forms of protection for specified types of 
information, for instance, laws that protect information that is 
submitted to the government, databases, and so-called “data 
exclusivity” laws.38 The possible sixth claim for relief, although 
limited and suffering from various preemption and preclusion 
problems, relates to common law misappropriation and unfair 
competition causes of action that are recognized in some states.39 
The limited types and scope of protection for information 
mean that not all information is protected by law and, in fact, 
not all “secret” or “confidential” information is protected. This is 
particularly true with respect to information that can be gleaned 
from public sources, whether the information is widely-
distributed or not. Although the language that is used under 
various areas of law, and in different countries, varies, 
generally, information that is “generally known,” “readily 
ascertainable,” and “in the public domain” is not protected.40 
Thus, the unprotected status of some information means that 
someone can “wrongfully acquire” information from another 
without violating a recognized interest in the information.41 This 
might happen, for instance, when the information taken does not 
qualify as “confidential information”42 in breach of confidence 
                                                          
 37. See Sharon K. Sandeen, A Contract by Any Other Name Is Still a 
Contract: Examining the Effectiveness of Trade Secret Clauses to Protect 
Databases, 45 IDEA 119, 146–150 (2005) (discussing some of the limitations of 
protecting trade secrets with contracts in the context of databases). 
 38. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (stating that any government agent or employee 
is subject to fines or imprisonment if, during the course of their employment, it 
discloses information that “concerns or relates to the trade secret, processes, 
operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential statistical 
data. . .” or any amount of income or expenditure); 41 U.S.C. § 2102 (2012) 
(stating that an employee of a private sector organization cannot knowingly 
disclose contractor bids or proposal information while working for the federal 
government). 
 39. See, e.g., Sioux Biochem., Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 785, 804 
(N.D. Iowa 2005) (discussing Iowa’s common law claim for misappropriation 
and the preemption and preclusion issues attendant thereto). 
 40. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974); Bonito Boats, 
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989). 
 41. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150. 
 42. See 19 C.F.R. 201.6(a)(1) (2017) (“[Confidential information] is 
information which concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes, 
operations, style of works, or apparatus, or to the production, sales, shipments, 
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jurisdictions, or as “trade secrets”43 in jurisdictions which apply 
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) definition, or as 
“property” where common law misappropriation claims are 
recognized.44 It can also happen where the alleged bad actor is 
not subject to a contractual or implied duty of confidentiality45 
or where the holder of the information does not own the 
information, for instance, businesses which collect and compile 
pre-existing information from public databases and individuals 
that, technically, is owned by others or no one.46 
III. THE ELUSIVE WRONGFUL ACQUISITION TORT 
Currently, when wrongfully acquired information meets the 
definition of a trade secret, then wrongful acquisition is a sub-
set of the “acquisition by improper means” form of trade secret 
misappropriation as defined in the UTSA, the DTSA, and the EU 
Trade Secret Directive, and can be redressed by bringing a claim 
for relief under those laws.47 Similarly, when the information 
meets the definition of “confidential information” in breach of 
confidence jurisdictions, a breach of confidence claim may lie. 
However, if the wrongfully acquired information does not meet 
                                                          
purchases, transfers, identification of customers, inventories, or amount or 
source of any income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any person, firm, 
partnership, corporation, or other organization, or other information of 
commercial value, the disclosure of which is likely to have the effect of either 
impairing the Commission’s ability to obtain such information as is necessary 
to perform its statutory functions, or causing substantial harm to the 
competitive position of the person, firm, partnership, corporation, or other 
organization from which the information was obtained, unless the Commission 
is required by law to disclose such information.”). 
 43. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2012) (stating a “trade secret” has three parts: 
(1) information; (2) reasonable measures taken to protect the information; and 
(3) which derives independent economic value from not being publicly known). 
 44. See SunPower Corp. v. SolarCity Corp., No. 12-CV-00694-LHK, 2012 
WL 6160472, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2012) (dismissing plaintiff’s common law 
misappropriation claim for failure to allege a sufficient property interest). 
 45. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 7 (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 1985) (stating the act does not apply to duties voluntarily assumed 
through an express or an implied-in-fact contract and the Act does not apply to 
duties imposed by law that are not dependent upon the existence of significant 
secret information). 
 46. See generally Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 154. 
 47. Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts 
Commit Error When They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 
HAMLINE L. REV. 493, 501 (2010). 
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the definition of a trade secret or confidential information, then 
some other claim for relief must exist. 
The principal hypothesis underlying this article is that no 
tort of “wrongful acquisition”48 developed in the United States 
either separately or as part of trade secret law. Instead, 
language of bad acts amounting to wrongful acquisition often 
appears in trade secret cases that otherwise involve breach of 
confidence claims.49 In this regard, most trade secret cases are 
imbued with the rhetoric of “theft” and “espionage” even if acts 
of wrongful acquisition did not occur. Thus, one must carefully 
examine the factual allegations of cases to distinguish between 
those involving the breach of confidence type of trade secret 
misappropriation (including claims of inducement of breach of a 
duty of confidence) and those involving wrongful acquisition 
claims as defined herein.50 A corollary hypothesis is that, even if 
a separate tort of wrongful acquisition developed at common law, 
a theory of harm for wrongful acquisition not accompanied by 
the subsequent disclosure or use of the wrongfully acquired 
information is non-existent. 
To test these hypotheses, relevant reported cases and 
secondary sources were examined that establish that few 
reported cases of the wrongful acquisition of trade secrets or 
other information exist in the United States. The first set of 
reported cases examined was for the period of 1837 (the date of 
the first trade secret case in the United States)51 to 1938 (the 
year before the Restatement (First) of Torts provisions on trade 
secret law were published).52 Using the online database, 
Westlaw, the author identified a pool of over 1200 cases and 
carefully reviewed the first 150, ranked by relevance. Next, 
using the initial 1200 cases, additional search queries were 
conducted for the terms “theft,” “bribery,” “misrepresentation,” 
                                                          
 48. To differentiate a wrongful acquisition tort from a trade secret or 
breach of confidence claim, the term “wrongful acquisition” is used herein to 
refer to bad acts that either: (1) do not involve breaches of the duty of confidence 
in the first or second degree; or (2) lead to the acquisition of unprotected 
information held by another. Breach of confidence in the “second degree” refers 
to acts by third-parties to the original misappropriation, where the first-party 
was subject to a duty of confidentiality. 
 49. Sandeen, supra note 47, at 499. 
 50. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 7 (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 1985). 
 51. Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523 (1837). 
 52. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, §§ 757–59 (1939). 
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“inducement of breach,” “espionage,” and “fraud,” in an attempt 
to find examples of wrongful acquisition cases.53 Additionally, 
because the language of “discovery by improper means” is 
contained in the Restatement (First) of Torts, section 757, the 
archives of the American Law Institute (ALI) related to the 
drafting of the provisions on trade secrecy, as well as early 
treatises and casebooks on tort law, were examined to identify 
additional cases involving allegations of wrongful acquisition 
and to determine if early tort scholars recognized the existence 
of a wrongful acquisition claim that was separate from the 
common law breach of confidence claim. This included a review 
of the Restatement’s provisions on trade secret law and the 
Reporter’s Explanatory Notes to those provisions.54 
It is clear from the early development of trade secret law in 
the United States that it was originally conceived of as an act of 
unfair competition resulting from a breach of confidence and 
that this conception of wrongdoing was borrowed from 
England.55 Justice Holmes famously said as much in E. I. duPont 
deNemours Powder Co. v. Masland.56 However, at that time, the 
cognizable harm was the “disclosure or use of another’s trade 
secret” as reflected in the first line of the Restatement (First) of 
Torts, section 757,57 highlighting the property aspects of trade 
secret law.58 It is also clear, based on the language of the 
                                                          
 53. All of these terms, with the exception of fraud, are listed as “improper 
means” in the UTSA. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1(1) 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985); cf. Trade Secret Directive, supra note 12 (listing 
practices that may be used for misappropriation including theft, unauthorized 
copying, and economic espionage). 
 54. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, explanatory notes § 2 cmt. a (AM. 
LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 6, 1938). 
 55. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a (1995) 
(citing Morison v. Moat (1851) 68 Eng. Rep. 492). 
 56. E. I. duPont deNemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917) 
(“Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not the defendant knows 
the facts, whatever they are, through a special confidence that he accepted. The 
property may be denied, but the confidence cannot be. Therefore, the starting 
point for the present matter is not property or due process of law, but that the 
defendant stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs, or one of them.”). 
 57. MILGRIM, supra note 3, § 1.01 n.82 (noting that under the Restatement 
(First) of Torts, acquisition by improper means was a predicate act for 
misappropriation, not a tortious act in itself). 
 58. See Eric R. Claeys, Private Law Theory and Corrective Justice in Trade 
Secrecy, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 9 (2011) (arguing that a property rights view of trade 
secret law is the theory that best explains the various features of trade secret 
law). 
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Restatement (First) of Torts, that the act of acquiring trade 
secrets and other business information by “improper means” or 
“improper procurement” has long been seen as an act of unfair 
competition in the United States. It is just not clear what the 
requisite harm is in the absence of a subsequent disclosure or 
use of the information and what justifications and defenses 
might apply to such behavior. 
An early case that appears to be the genesis of the 
acquisition by improper means theory of trade secret 
misappropriation is Tabor v. Hoffman, in which the defendant 
acquired copies of patterns for the manufacture of pumps.59 The 
question before the court was whether the patterns for a product 
that was patented and sold publicly could nonetheless qualify as 
trade secrets. The defendant had not acquired the patterns from 
public information, but obtained them from a vendor of 
plaintiff’s who copied the patterns and provided them to 
defendant.60 Thus, although the vendor was under a direct duty 
of confidentiality to the trade secret owner, the defendant was 
not. Under the UTSA, this set of facts would give rise to liability 
based upon the defendant’s knowledge or reason to know of the 
misappropriation by the vendor, but pursuant to common law, 
the court focused on the perceived wrongful acts of the 
defendant. In dicta, the court explained: “But, because this 
discovery may be possible by fair means, it would not justify a 
discovery by unfair means, such as the bribery of a clerk, who in 
course of his employment had aided in compounding the 
medicine, and had thus become familiar with the formula.”61 It 
is not clear from the reported case decision, however, whether 
Tabor involved acts of bribery.62 
Since it was decided in 1889, Tabor has been cited in more 
than 100 cases for four different but related principles: (1) that 
the public has the right to use information that has been 
disclosed to the public;63 (2) that trade secrets may exist even if 
the goods to which they are related are otherwise exposed to the 
public;64 (3) that the circumstances by which trade secrets are 
                                                          
 59. Tabor v. Hoffman, 23 N.E. 12, 12–13 (N.Y. 1889). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 36. 
 62. See id. 
 63. E.g., Kaylon, Inc. v. Collegiate Mfg. Co., 7 N.Y.S.2d 113, 114 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1938). 
 64. E.g., Edgar H. Wood Assocs. v. Skene, 347 Mass. 351, 364 (1964). 
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acquired may be actionable, even if the information could have 
been acquired rightfully;65 and (4) that trade secret owners may 
be entitled to permanent injunctive relief even in situations 
where an award of damages would be an adequate remedy.66 In 
keeping with the improper acquisition language of Tabor, the 
statements of subsequent courts about what constitutes 
improper acquisition usually include a trinity of some type of 
wrongful acquisition (usually fraud, theft, or bribery), breach of 
a duty of confidence, and breach of contract, but with little 
discussion of what might constitute wrongful acquisition not 
accompanied by a breach of confidence or a subsequent 
disclosure or use of trade secrets.67 
The provisions of the Restatement of Torts that address 
trade secret law reflect what the members of the ALI thought 
was the better reasoned law circa 1939. As a practical matter, 
they also reflect the case law that the drafters reviewed and 
relied upon. Significantly, however, none of the cases cited in the 
Reporter’s Explanatory Notes or in the commentary to the 
Restatement of Torts, sections 757–759, involve a wrongful 
acquisition claim (as that term is defined herein).68 Instead, the 
cases cited (less than 40) involve breach of confidence claims, 
including claims of inducement of breach involving the 
acquisition of trade secrets by a third party.69 This is true even 
with respect to Section 759 of the Restatement of Torts which sets 
forth the wrong (not adopted by the UTSA or the DTSA) of 
“procuring” the business information of another “for the purpose 
of advancing a rival business interest.” Thus, the comment to 
section 757, which defines “improper means” to include all 
means which “fall below the generally accepted standards of 
commercial morality and reasonable conduct” seems to have 
come out of thin air, or at least a thin body of reported 
decisions.70 Also, in 1939 an act of “discovery by improper 
means” alone did not result in a cognizable harm unless it was 
                                                          
 65. E.g., Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 402 
(1911). 
 66. E.g., Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 497 (2d Cir. 1953). 
 67. See, e.g., id. 
 68. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 757–59 (AM. LAW INST. 1939); 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, explanatory notes § 2 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST., 
Preliminary Draft No. 6, 1938). 
 69. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 757–59 (AM. LAW INST. 1939). 
 70. Id. § 757 cmt. f. 
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accompanied by a subsequent disclosure or use of the subject 
trade secrets.71 As explained in Milgrim: 
Notably, under the Restatement of Torts § 757 . . . the wrongful 
acquisition (i.e., “discovery by improper means”) of a trade secret is 
not in and of itself misappropriation but rather is simply a predicate 
for holding the wrongdoer liable for the later unauthorized use or 
disclosure of the secret. By contrast, under the UTSA, wrongful 
acquisition of a trade secret is independently actionable even if there 
is no ensuing use or disclosure.72 
In other words, the recognition of a claim of acquisition by 
improper means, not followed by a subsequent disclosure or use, 
did not officially occur until 1979 when the UTSA was adopted 
and was thereafter enacted by individual states. But it is not 
clear why the disconnection occurred. Additionally, although 
wrongful acquisition not followed by disclosure or use may be 
“actionable” under the UTSA (and now the DTSA), damage 
remedies remain unavailable in the absence of proof of actual 
harm.73 
Noting that the UTSA modified the wording of the 
Restatement to include, for the first time, language of acquisition 
by improper means not followed by disclosure or use,74 the 
author examined records of the American Bar Association (ABA) 
and the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State 
Laws (now the Uniform Law Commission (ULC)) to determine if 
there was an explanation for the change.75 There was none, and 
consequently, there is no record of a discussion of the nature of 
the required harm for acquisition by improper means if such act 
is not accompanied by a subsequent disclosure or use of the 
subject trade secrets. Indeed, the only relevant information that 
is contained in the drafting history of the UTSA is a brief 
discussion of Christopher, one of only a handful of reported 
wrongful acquisition cases that were found as part of this 
project. 
                                                          
 71. Id. § 757. This is consistent with U.S. patent, copyright, and trademark 
law which each require some use of the intellectual property rights as a part of 
the plaintiff’s claim of infringement. 
 72. MILGRIM, supra note 3, § 1(2) (citations omitted); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
 73. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(B); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 
AMENDMENTS § 3 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). 
 74. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1 (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 1985). 
 75. Copies of the records are on file with the author; originals remain in the 
archives of the ABA and ULC. 
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Finally, the author reviewed Milgrim on Trade Secrets and 
undertook a search of relevant cases cited therein.76 The Milgrim 
treatise confirmed that there is a paucity of reported case 
decisions involving claims that trade secrets were wrongfully 
acquired.77 Thus, a review of relevant secondary resources and a 
search of reported cases from 1837 to present reveals little 
jurisprudence to support or explain the development of a 
wrongful acquisition tort within or outside of trade secret law. 
This may explain why there are few prosecutions under the 
Economic Espionage Act of 1996 as well.78 Either there are not 
a lot of incidents involving the wrongful acquisition of trade 
secrets and other information, or acts of wrongful acquisition are 
not being detected. 
One explanation for the paucity of wrongful acquisition 
cases before (and since) 1979 is that most trade secret cases 
involve parties that are in a confidential relationship and, of 
those, most involve the employer-employee relationship.79 
Typically, in an employer-employee case, there is no claim of 
acquisition by improper means because the employer voluntarily 
disclosed its secrets to its employees.80 Allegations of wrongful 
acquisition creep into reported cases with respect to claims not 
involving employees, but even then, the focus of the cases is often 
on the existence of a duty of confidentiality between the trade 
secret owner and a former employee.81 An explanation for this 
relates to the struggles of early courts to develop theories to hold 
third-parties (those not engaged in the initial misappropriation) 
                                                          
 76. See generally MILGRIM, supra note 3. 
 77. Id. § 15.01 (“The issue of wrongful taking, however, arises relatively 
rarely: the vast preponderance of disputes in the law of misappropriation arise 
from proper acquisition followed by later unauthorized use or disclosure.”). 
 78. But cf. Press Release, U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch, Senate, House Leaders 
Introduce Bipartisan, Bicameral Bill to Protect Trade Secrets (July 29, 2015) 
(“Current federal criminal law is insufficient. Although the Economic Espionage 
Act of 1996 made trade secret theft a crime, the Department of Justice lacks the 
resources to prosecute many such cases.”). 
 79. For an example of the centrality of the employer-employee relationship 
in some trade secret cases, see Richdale Dev. Co. v. McNeil Co., 508 N.W.2d 853, 
855 (Neb. 1993) (“The elements necessary to establish a cause of action for 
misappropriation of a trade secret are . . . (4) the communication of the secret 
to the employee while he was employed in a position of trust and confidence and 
under circumstances making it inequitable and unjust for him to disclose it to 
others or to use it himself to the employer’s prejudice.”). 
 80. See id. 
 81. See, e.g., Comput. Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 718–19 (2d 
Cir. 1992). 
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liable for their subsequent disclosure or use of the subject trade 
secrets.82 In the U.S., this was done by imposing a duty upon 
third-parties not to disclose or use trade secrets once they knew 
or had reason to know of the existence of trade secrets and their 
misappropriation.83 
Separate from the few cases that discuss the wrongful 
acquisition of trade secrets, a body of common law developed 
that some courts label the “improper procurement” tort.84 It is 
reflected in Section 759 of the Restatement (First) of Torts, which 
states: “One who, for the purpose of advancing a rival business 
interest, procures by improper means information about 
another’s business is liable to the other for the harm caused by 
his possession, disclosure or use of the information.”85 The 
significance of this tort for present purposes is that it could 
protect confidential business information not rising to the level 
of a trade secret, thereby potentially providing guidance 
concerning the elements of a non-trade secret based wrongful 
acquisition tort. However, despite its inclusion in the 
Restatement (First) of Torts, there are not many reported cases 
before or after 1939 that explain the parameters of the improper 
procurement tort. This is in part because of the general paucity 
of cases involving acquisition of information by improper means, 
but also because such a claim was subsequently precluded by the 
reasoning of Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corporation.86 and by the 
UTSA,87 both of which limit the availability of tort claims for the 
misappropriation of information. Moreover, while seemingly 
covering more business information than trade secrets, the 
requirement of harm under Section 759 still demanded a level of 
confidentiality similar to trade secrecy.88 As explained in 
Comment b to Section 759: “There are no limitations as to the 
type of information included except that it relate to matters in 
his business. Generally, however, if the improper discovery of 
the information is to cause harm, the information must be of a 
                                                          
 82. See Sandeen, supra note 47, at 500. 
 83. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1(2)(ii)(B) (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 1985). 
 84. E.g., DeWoody v. Ripley, 951 S.W.2d 935, 948 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997). 
 85. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 759 (AM. LAW INST. 1939). 
 86. See Sandeen, supra note 47, at 515–17. 
 87. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 7 (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 1985). 
 88. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 759 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939). 
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secret or confidential character.”89 Importantly, Section 759 does 
not reflect a decision to do away with the traditional 
requirement of actual harm for tort claims related to the 
wrongful acquisition of information and is inconsistent with a 
trespassory theory of harm. 
The drafting history of the UTSA, consisting of hundreds of 
pages of source documents obtained from the ABA and the ULC, 
also does not contain a robust discussion of the wrongful 
acquisition type of trade secret misappropriation, even though 
the UTSA’s definition of misappropriation is a departure from 
the language of the Restatement (First) of Torts in that it defines 
“acquisition . . . by improper means” as a wrong disconnected 
from a subsequent disclosure or use.90 The impetus behind the 
UTSA was multifaceted, but was primarily a desire to fix 
perceived abuses in the interpretation and application of the 
common law of trade secrecy by limiting the scope of trade secret 
protection in numerous respects.91 The drafters of the UTSA 
were particularly concerned about the assertion of tort claims 
not requiring proof of the existence of viable trade secrets and 
the likelihood that such claims were preempted by federal law 
as explained in Kewanee.92 This explains why Section 759 of the 
Restatement (First) of Torts was not carried over into the UTSA 
or the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition,93 but it does 
not explain why “acquisition . . . by improper means” was 
included as a potential wrong without a requirement of a 
subsequent disclosure or use and what the required “harm” 
might be in the absence of disclosure or use.94 
As stated in Milgrim: 
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act provides a somewhat different test 
than trade secret common law. While in the great preponderance of 
                                                          
 89. Id. 
 90. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1(2) (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 1985). 
 91. See Sandeen, supra note 47, at 507. 
 92. See id. at 527–29. 
 93. Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 759 (AM. LAW INST. 1939) 
(“One who, for the purpose of advancing a rival business interest, procures by 
improper means information about another’s business is liable to the other for 
the harm caused by his possession, disclosure or use of the information.”), with 
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
1985) (defining trade secret), and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 39 (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (defining trade secret). 
 94. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1(2) (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 1985). 
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cases, the wrongful conduct consists of unauthorized use or disclosure, 
it should not be overlooked that unauthorized access or acquisition 
alone may give rise to a cause of action . . . However, where access is 
authorized, the issue of claimed trade secret misappropriation will 
turn upon whether the recipient engaged in wrongful use or 
disclosure. In other words, mere access or acquisition without 
wrongful conduct will not generate trade secret liability.95 
This change, while not discussed in the drafting history of 
the UTSA, appears to have been influenced by Christopher,96 
which was decided in 1970 during the early stages of the UTSA 
drafting project.97 
As in Tabor, a critical fact of Christopher is that the 
defendants who were sued owed no duty of trust or confidence to 
the plaintiff, but unlike Tabor, none of the actors who facilitated 
the acquisition of DuPont’s trade secrets owed any duty of trust 
or confidence.98 Thus, the “wrong” was the acquisition of trade 
secrets without any duty of confidence in the first or second 
degree.99 Characterizing the defendants acts as “industrial 
espionage”100 and “school boy’s tricks,”101 and applying a cost 
benefit analysis, the court explained: “Commercial privacy must 
be protected from espionage which could not have been 
reasonably anticipated or prevented.”102 Significantly, however, 
the court was careful not to impugn all acts of information 
collection, explaining: 
We do not mean to imply, however, that everything not in plain view 
is within the protected vale, nor that all information obtained through 
every extra optical extension is forbidden. Indeed, for our industrial 
competition to remain healthy there must be breathing room for 
observing a competing industrialist. A competitor can and must shop 
his competition for pricing and examine his products for quality, 
components, and methods of manufacture.103 
 
                                                          
 95. MILGRIM, supra note 3, § 15.01 (2017) (citations omitted). 
 96. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 
1970), cert denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971). 
 97. See Sandeen, supra note 47, at 510–13 (describing aspects of the 
drafting history of the UTSA). 
 98. See Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1016. 
 99. See id. (“DuPont has a valid cause of action to prohibit the Christophers 
from improperly discovering its trade secret and to prohibit the undisclosed 
third party from using the improperly obtained information.”). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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Also, given the procedural posture of the case (an appeal 
from an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss), the 
court did not consider the nature and extent of DuPont’s harm, 
other than to point out that there was evidence that the 
defendants disclosed the information to a third-party.104 
In keeping with the paucity of wrongful acquisition cases, 
Christopher has been cited in only fifty-three reported cases in 
the United States.105 The case has been cited mostly for one of 
two propositions: (1) that improper means of acquiring trade 
secrets need not amount to a crime or tort; and (2) that trade 
secret owners are only required to engage in “reasonable efforts” 
to protect their trade secrets and are not required to institute 
extreme and unduly expensive security measures.106 
Christopher is cited more often in secondary sources (402 times) 
as an example of an acquisition by improper means form of trade 
secret misrepresentation case, proving its influence despite its 
lack of details.107 The problem with relying upon Christopher to 
define a wrongful acquisition tort (if one is to be further 
developed), is that it does not discuss all the elements of such a 
tort. While the court recognized that DuPont had to prove the 
existence of a trade secret and its misappropriation, it does not 
discuss the classic tort elements of causation and harm, 
specifically what constitutes a cognizable harm if the trade 
secrets are not subsequently disclosed or used. 
Reported cases since Christopher involving wrongful 
acquisition claims are few and typically fail to discuss the 
elements of such a claim in detail. Most of the cases listed in 
Milgrim are cited for the proposition that, in the absence of a 
claim that the plaintiff’s trade secrets were disclosed or used, a 
                                                          
 104. Id. at 1012. 
 105. See E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, WESTLAW, 
https://1.next.westlaw.com/ (from the page displaying text of the case for 
Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, follow hyperlinks to “Citing References” and then 
to “Cases.”). 
 106. See, e.g., Phillips v. Frey, 20 F.3d 623, 630 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing 
Christopher for the proposition that a higher standard than “the law of the 
jungle” applies when evaluating improper means); Sheet v. Yamaha Motors 
Corp., U.S.A., 849 F.2d 179, 182 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing E. I. duPont deNemours 
& Co. v. Christopher, among others, to explain the “relative secrecy” standard 
which requires reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy). 
 107. See E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, WESTLAW, 
https://1.next.westlaw.com/ (from the page displaying text of the case for 
Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, follow hyperlinks to “Citing References” and then 
to “Secondary Sources”). 
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trade secret owner can state a claim for relief by alleging that it 
owns trade secrets that were acquired by improper means.108 In 
such cases, the plaintiff has the burden of pleading and proving 
the existence of trade secrets and their improper acquisition, but 
it is unclear how the requisite harm would be shown. If trade 
secret misappropriation is viewed as a type of property claim, 
then it might be argued that the harm is the invasion of a 
property interest, similar to the harm recognized for a trespass 
to real property.109 But if it is viewed as a form of unfair 
competition, then a non-property based theory of harm must be 
articulated. Of course, the lack of discussion of cognizable harm 
becomes more critical when a claim of wrongful acquisition 
concerns information that does not qualify for some form of legal 
protection. 
With respect to the common law development of a wrongful 
acquisition tort, the conundrum is that if information is 
wrongfully acquired but not subsequently disclosed or used, 
there is no harm to the information nor an argument of unjust 
enrichment on which to base a claim for monetary damages. If 
the information is not protected as a property right by some body 
of law, such as trade secret law, then a theory of harm based 
upon trespass does not work either. Additionally, unlike 
personal information that is the focus of privacy or rights of 
publicity claims, businesses do not have an interest in their 
information that might support an allegation of dignitary harm. 
Thus, even in trade secret cases involving the alleged wrongful 
acquisition of information, there may be a wrong but no 
protectable trade secrets and, therefore, no remedy. Other areas 
of information law involve similar weaknesses. In the case of 
patent and copyright law, for instance, the wrongful behavior 
must constitute a violation of a limited list of exclusive rights 
                                                          
 108. See MILGRIM, supra note 3 (“Misappropriation . . . includes 
unauthorized acquisition, use and disclosure. The two principal claims that are 
asserted in a misappropriation civil case are breach of contract and breach of 
confidence.”); see also Comment, Theft of Trade Secrets: The Need for a Statutory 
Solution, 120 U PA. L. REV. 378, 383 n.34 (1971) (claiming that “the exhaustive 
list of cases dries up when the discussion reached industrial espionage without 
subversion of employees or trespass.”). 
 109. See Claeys, supra note 58, at 37 (discussing the right to a trade secret 
as “conceptual property” and explaining how “trespass ordinarily embodies and 
declares a normative interest that owners may exclude all unconsented entries 
for virtually any reason”). 
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and the subject information must meet the definition of 
protected information.110 
IV. SHOULD A SEPARATE TORT OF WRONGFUL 
ACQUISITION BE RECOGNIZED? 
The possibility that unprotected or non-owed information 
held by a business or individual may be wrongfully acquired 
suggests the need for a wrongful acquisition tort either 
developed at common law or by statute, but it does not answer 
the question whether such a tort should be recognized. Our laws 
do not currently provide remedies for all perceived wrongdoing 
but, instead, reflect policy choices that usually involve a 
weighing of competing interests. As noted previously, it is 
generally understood that competition and the free flow of 
unprotected information is the rule and that intellectual 
property protections (including trade secret laws) are limited 
exceptions to the rule designed to benefit society in some way.111 
Thus, it must be asked what society would gain from a law that 
restricts the acquisition (and the disclosure or use) of otherwise 
unprotected information, and what might it lose? Assuming (as 
the definition of “wrongful acquisition” used herein does) that an 
act of wrongful acquisition does not involve a recognized 
property interest or a cognizable harm, there is no property 
interest to be protected or harm to be rectified that relates to the 
information itself. 
The rhetoric of “theft” that pervades trade secret law and 
accusations of cyber-hacking suggests that many assume that all 
acts leading to the unauthorized acquisition of information 
should be deemed “wrongful.” However, as the court in 
Christopher recognized, a commitment to free enterprise and a 
competitive market environment requires a more nuanced view; 
one that recognizes the value of information flows, particularly 
for information that is not protected by an existing body of 
law.112 This is particularly true if the subject information was 
                                                          
 110. See, e.g., WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 3 (1997) (“Generally speaking, intellectual 
property law aims at safeguarding creators and other producers of intellectual 
goods and services by granting them certain time-limited rights to control the 
use made of those productions.”). 
 111. See supra Section II. 
 112. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th 
Cir. 1970), cert denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971). 
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acquired for a salutary purpose, such as revealing criminal 
behavior, sharing unprotected information, or enhancing 
competition. As things currently stand, U.S. law makes a rough 
distinction between acquisition of information for improper 
versus beneficial purposes by providing a claim for relief for only 
trade secrets and other categories of protected information.113 If 
the United States and other countries wish to create a 
standalone wrongful acquisition tort for otherwise unprotected 
information, then the resulting claim for relief should be limited 
in other ways. 
Under tort law, not all wrongful behavior results in a claim 
for relief. Rather, whether tort liability is imposed usually 
depends upon the ability to articulate some “fault” of the 
defendant that society wishes to sanction and that caused actual 
harm to the plaintiff. Ordinarily, fault is defined by some 
combination of: (1) the nature of the defendant’s acts; (2) the 
defendant’s mental state; and (3) the type of resulting harm.114 
Thus, the first step in the development of a wrongful acquisition 
tort requires that the bad acts of the defendant be defined. With 
respect to other types of information torts, including trade secret 
law, the bad acts relate directly to the existence of a property-
like right.115 And, as explained in Demetriades v. Kaufmann, the 
property right exists independently and at the inception of the 
wrongful acquisition; it is not created by the mere taking of the 
information itself.116 
The foregoing suggests that one means of fashioning a 
wrongful acquisition tort for information that is not otherwise 
protected by law is to expand the definition of protectable 
information to include all forms of information held by an 
individual or company.117 The problem with this approach, 
however, is that it would be inconsistent with the important 
policy choices that have already been made concerning the 
protection and dissemination of information.118 It would also be 
inconsistent with the desire to rid the law of the hodge-podge of 
information-related claims that existed at common law and was 
a principal motivating factor behind the enactment of the UTSA, 
                                                          
 113. See, e.g., id. at 1014. 
 114. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS §§1–2 (2d ed. 2011). 
 115. See supra note 29. 
 116. Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 698 F. Supp. 521, 527–28 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See supra Section II. 
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explaining why section 7 of the UTSA was adopted to preclude 
all pre-existing tort and equitable claims related to the 
misappropriation of “competitively significant” information.119 
Moreover, recognizing property-like rights with respect to wide 
swaths of information would likely quell the use of information 
that is part of the public domain and is inconsistent with the 
rejection of the “sweat of the brow” doctrine in the United 
States.120 Additionally, while such an approach might be 
welcomed by database owners that have their information 
taken, it would be unwelcomed when they are sued for allowing 
the hacking of the customer information they hold. Currently, 
database owners benefit from the limits that are placed upon 
their potential liability by the very tort principles that make 
recognition of a wrongful acquisition tort difficult.121 
Ordinarily, when new torts are developed to address gaps in 
existing law, different or additional elements are added so that 
the new tort is not simply a lesser included tort with fewer 
elements to be proven.122 Instead, the missing element is 
replaced with another and more exacting element.123 Consider, 
for instance, the torts of conversion and trespass to chattels: 
although both concern interferences with personal property, 
they have different required elements with the “lesser” tort of 
trespass to chattel having a more exacting element of harm.124 
Another example is the tort of “misappropriation” as defined in 
                                                          
 119. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 7 cmt. (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 1985). But note that not all UTSA states have enacted section 7 
as is worded in the UTSA. 
 120. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 353 (1991) 
(“The ‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine had numerous flaws, the most glaring being 
that it extended copyright protection in a compilation beyond selection and 
arrangement—the compiler’s original contributions—to the facts themselves.”). 
 121. See Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of 
Tort Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255, 275 (2005) (discussing how the lack of a 
relationship between database owners and the individuals whose data is 
contained in the databases limits tort liability). 
 122. See generally Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234–
35 (1918) (explaining that there was a need for a new theory of wrongdoing and 
using unfair competition law as a basis for devising the new theory); Intel Corp. 
v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 302–03 (Cal. 2003) (explaining that the torts of trespass 
to chattels and conversion have similar elements but are also different in that 
a trespass to chattels has a more demanding requirement for harm). 
 123. See Intel, 71 P.3d at 302–03. 
 124. See id. at 302 (comparing the two torts—trespass to chattel and 
conversion—and quoting Prosser who called trespass to chattel the “little 
brother of conversion”). 
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International News Service v. Associated Press.125 In that case, 
the Supreme Court, sitting in equity, devised a theory of 
wrongdoing that did not alter the policy concerning the freedom 
to use public information, but still provided a remedy for what 
the Court perceived as improper behavior.126 The Court did this 
by focusing on the unfair competition aspects of defendant’s 
behavior, defining the defendant’s acts as “taking” the material 
of complainant “and selling it as its own.”127 The wrong was 
acquiring the plaintiff’s time-sensitive information for the 
specific purpose of re-selling it in competition with the 
complainant, coupled with misrepresenting the source of the 
information.128 The reasoning of Christopher has a similar, but 
perhaps unappreciated, structure: the court defined the wrong 
as “industrial espionage” with an intent to acquire the 
information for the specific purpose of sharing it with a third-
party.129 For a wrongful acquisition tort that is separate from a 
trade secret claim, what would substitute for the missing 
property-like interest? 
Of course, courts and lawmakers could be direct and 
intentional about defining the required wrongful acts, state of 
mind, and harms of a wrongful acquisition tort so that they are 
sufficiently robust to substitute for the usual requirement of 
protectable information. But a question for policymakers is: How 
precise should the tort be in defining the required wrongful 
behavior? Currently, at least under the principles expressed in 
International News Service and Christopher, courts have some 
leeway to decide what constitutes “unfair competition” and “the 
standard of morality expected in our commercial relationships,” 
but these are malleable standards that would not be appropriate 
for a claim which would not involve information that is otherwise 
protected by law.130 Under the existing information torts, 
including trade secret law, the existence of an identifiable 
                                                          
 125. See Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 241. Although the “hot news” tort 
continues to be discussed in information law circles, arguably, it was effectively 
overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Erie Railroad Co. 
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 126. Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 241. 
 127. Id. at 231. 
 128. Id. at 230–31. 
 129. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th 
Cir. 1970), cert denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971). 
 130. See Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1015–16; Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 
234–35. 
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property right is an important grounding principle.131 Without 
it, other, more precise, concepts of wrongdoing are needed.132 
When balanced against the strong public interest in the diffusion 
of non-confidential information, including the importance of 
information diffusion in the development of knowledge and 
innovation, it seems that making the wrongful acquisition tort 
an intentional tort that requires specific behaviors would be the 
best course of action, if such a tort is created at all. 
An example of this approach is provided in the EU Database 
Directive which defines a wrong that goes beyond the mere 
acquisition of protected data to require the “extraction and/or re-
utilization of the whole or a substantial part” of a qualifying 
database.133 In keeping with this approach, the required bad acts 
of a wrongful acquisition tort might require specific “bad” 
behaviors. For instance, the requisite bad acts might be defined 
by reference to existing crimes or torts. This is consistent with 
the part of the definition of “improper means” under the UTSA 
and DTSA which refers to specific tortious and criminal 
behaviors,134 but since a wrongful acquisition tort would be 
disconnected from an existing property interest, something more 
should be required, like a heightened intent or harm 
requirement. 
Every tort claim includes a required mental state, ranging 
from the specific to the general, that helps determine and define 
the culpability of an actor.135 Even in cases where strict liability 
                                                          
 131. See generally Claeys, supra note 58. 
 132. E.g., Database Directive, supra note 10, art. 7 (giving an example a 
precise concept of wrongdoing in re-utilizing of at least a majority of a database). 
 133. Id. 
 134. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5)(A) (2012); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS 
ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). 
 135. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 114, § 2 (categorizing torts as intentional, 
or negligent, while noting that some courts recognize a category of tort between 
intentional and negligent, referred to as “willful or wanton”). Intentional and 
willful or wanton torts clearly implicate a mental state. Id. (indicating that 
these categories require at least awareness of the act). Even negligent torts, 
which do not require tortfeasors to be subjectively aware that their conduct is 
creating unreasonable risk, see id., require some degree of culpability. See, e.g., 
Breunig v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 173 N.W.2d 619, 623 (Wis. 1970) (recognizing 
that a person cannot be liable in negligence for loss of consciousness while 
driving if that loss of consciousness resulted from forces that were “not attended 
with sufficient warning or should not have been reasonably foreseen”). See 
generally Tort, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/tort (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2018) (giving examples of the elements of a number of torts, 
which show that some type of mental intent is required). 
2018] OUT OF THIN AIR 397 
 
is imposed, there is at least the required mental state of 
engaging in the activity to which strict liability attaches.136 
Thus, for instance, although both patent and copyright law do 
not require proof that the defendant intended to infringe the 
plaintiff’s rights, they do require proof that the defendant 
volitionally engaged in infringing behavior.137 Requiring a more 
exacting and specific mental state of the defendant in a wrongful 
acquisition case would be one way to create balance where a 
wrongful acquisition tort is defined so as not to require a 
protectable property interest. It is also consistent with the 
rhetoric surrounding cyber-hacking, which seems to assume that 
all cyber-hackers are acting with evil intent.138 If it is bad acts 
coupled with evil intent that is at the heart of the concerns about 
cyber-hacking and other forms of wrongful acquisition, then we 
should require both if designing a separate wrongful acquisition 
tort. 
The critical question with respect to an intent requirement 
is: what degree of knowledge or intent by the defendant should 
be required? In the case of U.S. trade secret law, liability is 
conditioned on proof that the defendant knew or had reason to 
know of the existence of trade secrets and the act of 
misappropriation.139 To substitute for a missing property right, 
a wrongful acquisition tort should require a more demanding 
type of knowledge or intent. This is the approach taken by the 
CFAA which, in part, defines the required wrongdoing as: 
“intentionally access[ing] a computer without authorization or 
exceed[ing] authorized access, and thereby 
                                                          
 136. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 114, § 437 (stating that strict liability 
rests on a defendant’s creation or introduction of some abnormally dangerous 
condition, thus suggesting the defendant must choose, on some level to engage 
in behavior creating that abnormal risk). 
 137. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (describing patent infringing acts as 
“mak[ing], us[ing], offer[ing] to sell, or sell[ing]” a patented invention without 
permission—all volitional acts); Peter Keros, Volitional Conduct: An Element of 
Copyright Infringement, BEJIN BIENEMAN: THE SOFTWARE IP REP. (Feb. 21, 
2017), https://www.b2ipreport.com/swip-report/volitional-conduct-an-element-
of-copyright-infringement/ (citing a recent case that supported the proposition 
that volitional conduct is required for copyright infringement). 
 138. See generally Paul Gil, What Are ‘Black Hat’ and ‘White Hat’ Hackers?, 
LIFEWIRE (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.lifewire.com/black-hat-hacker-a-white-
hat-hacker-4061415 (explaining that ‘black hat’ hackers are the hackers we 
view as having evil intentions when performing hacking online). 
 139. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1(2) (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 1985). 
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obtain[ing] . . . information from any protected computer” or 
“knowingly and with intent to defraud, access[ing] a protected 
computer without authorization, or exceed[ing] authorized 
access, and . . . further[ing] the intended fraud and obtain[ing] 
anything of value.”140 Both INS and Christopher provide some 
guidance on a state of mind requirement because of the courts’ 
reference to the purposes for which the defendants engaged in 
the challenged behaviors.141 So too the common law tort specified 
in Restatement (First) of Torts, which required that the 
defendant act “for the purpose of advancing a rival business 
interest.”142 The problem with the purposes defined in those 
sources, however, is that they tread close to the purpose of 
engaging in robust competition, which numerous cases have held 
is appropriate behavior in a free market economy.143 This is 
particularly true with respect to information that has been 
publicly disclosed. Businesses frequently acquire information 
about their rivals, and it is not improper or morally wrong to use 
such information to compete with a rival, so long as the 
information is not otherwise protected by law.144 
The required bad acts of wrongful acquisition, either a tort 
or a crime, may include intent requirements that could be 
incorporated into a wrongful acquisition tort, requiring the same 
proof of intent as is required for the subject tort or crime. Short 
of this approach, if wrongful acquisition can be established upon 
proof of an act not amounting to a tort or crime (the Christopher 
scenario), an intent to engage in the wrongful acquisition for a 
very specific purpose, such as harming the information owner or 
its customers, might be required. This would limit potential 
liability for the acts of those who access non-protected 
information for their personal, non-commercial, or 
                                                          
 140. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2), (4) (2012). 
 141. See E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971) (“[T]he Christophers 
deliberately flew over the DuPont plant to get pictures of a process which 
DuPont had attempted to keep secret. The Christophers delivered their pictures 
to a third party who was certainly aware of the means by which they had been 
acquired . . . .”). 
 142. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 759 (AM. LAW INST. 1939). 
 143. See generally N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Berkey 
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 144. See generally Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 
141, 144–46 (1989); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1995). 
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whistleblowing uses and would be consistent with notions of 
“fair use” under U.S. copyright law.145 Additionally, because 
much of the information that today’s businesses collect and store 
does not originate with them and is not owned by them (because 
it was gleaned from public sources or collected from their 
customers),146 a mental state requirement should require 
something more than the defendant’s intent to acquire 
information held by another. Like the improper procurement 
tort of Section 759 of the Restatement (First) of Torts, a wrongful 
acquisition tort might require the acquisition of identifiable 
holder-generated information for the specific purpose of 
establishing a competing database. Or, analogizing to the crime 
of burglary, it might require the entering into a computer system 
with a specific intent to engage in additional wrongful behavior. 
Failing to get the state of mind element right could result in 
a wrongful acquisition tort that is over- or under-inclusive; 
under-inclusive in that it does not provide a remedy for bad 
behavior that society wishes to deter, or over-inclusive for 
providing a remedy for behavior that was engaged in without 
culpable intent, for instance for a beneficial or altruistic purpose. 
The CFAA has been criticized for being unclear and not getting 
the balance right.147 One problem with the language of the CFAA 
is that it is often difficult for users of computers to know when 
their authorization to access and use information begins and 
when it ends because they never read the limitations that are 
embedded in lengthy employment agreements or terms of use 
agreements or because those limitations are written in 
                                                          
 145. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (explaining the factors that determine fair 
use). 
 146. See Andrew McAfee & Erik Brynjolfsson, Big Data: The Management 
Revolution, HARV. BUS. REV., Oct. 2012, https://hbr.org/2012/10/big-data-the-
management-revolution. 
 147. See, e.g., Lee Goldman, Interpreting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 
13 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 15–19 (2012); Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness 
Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1563–
71 (2010); Note, The Vagaries of Vagueness: Rethinking the CFAA as a Problem 
of Private Nondelegation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 751 (2013); Andrew Trombly, Right 
for the Wrong Reasons: The Ninth Circuit Excludes Misappropriation from the 
CFAA’s Ambit in United States v. Nosal, 54 B.C.L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 129, 
140 (2013); Garrett D. Urban, Causing Damage Without Authorization: The 
Limitations of Current Judicial Interpretations of Employee Authorization 
Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1369, 1373 
(2011). 
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ambiguous language.148 However, for torts and crimes to act as 
deterrents (presumably, the chief purpose of a wrongful 
acquisition tort), individuals and companies should be able to 
discern the required intent and prohibited behaviors. 
Additionally, where such behaviors hew too closely to desired 
behaviors, particularly the collection, dissemination, and use of 
publicly available information, we should err on the side of 
limiting potential liability. 
Under longstanding principles of tort law, ordinarily there 
can be no tort recovery without a wrongful act that causes 
cognizable injury. Yet, the focus of much of the rhetoric about 
the wrongful acquisition of information, particularly cyber-
hacking, relates to the act of acquiring information, and not on 
any resulting harm.149 Ironically, the absence of cognizable harm 
is the argument that defendants in data breach litigation often 
use to avoid liability to their customers, arguing that the mere 
hacking and holding of information by the wrongdoers is not a 
cognizable harm.150 As the Court explained in Spokeo: “To 
establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she 
suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is 
‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical.’”151 Thus, defendants in data breach 
cases understand that the cognizable harm requirement of tort 
theory has the effect of reducing the number of lawsuits that are 
brought since, even though someone may have engaged in 
otherwise-tortious behavior, no recovery will be granted unless 
the plaintiff suffered actual harm. 
                                                          
 148. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 860 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(“Significant notice problems arise if we allow criminal liability to turn on the 
vagaries of private polices that are lengthy, opaque, subject to change and 
seldom read.”). 
 149. See, e.g., Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877 (Cal. 2011) 
(overturning Silvaco’s decision confining standing under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 
§ 17204 to those who are eligible for restitution); Silvaco Data Sys. v. Intel 
Corp., 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 27, 56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (assuming harm, for 
purposes of federal standing doctrine, satisfied by impeding further use, but 
requiring a plaintiff to show eligibility for restitution in order to establish 
standing under California law). 
 150. See Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 366–67 (M.D. Pa. 2015); 
see also Whalen v. Michael Stores Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 577, 577–78 
(E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 151. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (quoting Lujan v. 
Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
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While harm is always a required element of a tort, 
sometimes the tort defines the harm, as is the case with false 
imprisonment (wherein the harm is the very confinement that is 
also the tortious wrong); the principal issue being the dollar 
value associated with the emotional distress and lost time 
associated with the confinement.152 Similarly, the development 
of causes of action designed to protect information, including 
copyright and trade secret law, did not ignore the essential 
requirement that the defendant’s actions cause cognizable harm. 
Instead, they broadened how harm could be conceived and 
measured and provided non-monetary remedies to prevent 
threatened harm.153 Thus, for instance, trade secret law under 
both the UTSA and DTSA allows for injunctive relief even in the 
absence of actual harm if it can be shown that there is a 
threatened disclosure or use of the subject trade secrets.154 
Where a trade secret claimant wishes to recover monetary 
damages, actual harm must be proven, but pursuant to 
statutorily defined measures of damages that are broader than 
what was allowed under common law.155 Conceivably, the same 
approach could be followed with respect to a wrongful 
acquisition tort, but any measure of damage typically relates to 
some actual effect upon the defendant.156 
Typically, the harm associated with information torts 
relates directly to the property nature of the information, with 
the harm measured by the loss of income that could have been 
derived from authorizing use of the property, the unjust 
enrichment derived by the defendant from using the 
information, or, in the case of trade secrets, by the loss of the 
property rights themselves.157 A theory of trespass that would 
                                                          
 152. See generally BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND 
LITIGATION § 41:3 (2d ed., 2017). 
 153. See R. Clifton Merrell, Trespass to Chattels in the Age of the Internet, 
80 WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 675, 679 (2002). 
 154. Sharon K. Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward a Federal 
Jurisprudence of Trade Secret Law, 32 BERK. TECH. L.J. 829, 900–02 (2018) 
(describing differences between the remedies provisions of the UTSA and DTSA 
with respect to the scope of available injunctive relief). 
 155. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(B); UNIF. 
TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 3 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). 
 156. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1995). 
 157. See, e.g., NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 158 (2015) (“All of these ‘informational torts’ 
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give rise to, at least, nominal damages, is not a feature of 
information laws.158 This limitation means that the use of a 
trade secret law to deter cyber-hacking is sub-optimal because 
there is too much beyond the act of hacking (misappropriation) 
that must be proven for relief to be granted.159 However, if a sui 
generis wrongful acquisition tort is created to provide a claim for 
relief without proof of a protectable property interest, the 
requirement of a cognizable harm becomes even more important. 
The CFAA provides a potential model, but one that does not 
make the element of harm more exacting than it is under 
common law or the expanded remedies provisions of other 
information torts. Instead, the CFAA is remarkable for not only 
not requiring that the subject information be within a legally 
protected class of information, such as trade secret or even 
confidential and proprietary information, but for defining 
possible harms broadly.160 According to the CFAA, “damage” 
means “any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a 
program, a system, or information.”161 Even more broadly, “loss” 
is defined to mean: “[A]ny reasonable cost to any victim, 
including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a 
damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or 
information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue 
lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred 
because of interruption of service.”162 While this broad 
conception of harm was obviously designed to address the 
perceived bad acts of cyber-hacking, it can be criticized for not 
giving sufficient deference to the non-protectable status of some 
hacked information, as well as the strong public policy that 
favors information diffusion. 
Finally, another policy lever that is available to courts and 
policymakers who wish to create a wrongful acquisition tort that 
appropriately balances the interests of the public and the 
                                                          
share some (but not all) of a relatively small number of elements, including . . . 
harm to emotions, harm to a property interest, or reliance on trust.”). 
 158. See Merrell, supra note 153, at 677–87, 689 (“[T]respass to land does 
not requires harm and allows for nominal damages.”). 
 159. See, e.g., id. at 681 n.53 (discussing a situation in which the Washington 
Supreme Court “relied on a criminal statute prohibiting hacking, as opposed to 
a civil case of trespass based on common law,” because of its limited 
applicability). 
 160. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
 161. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 162. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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information holder relates to possible defenses. All defenses that 
currently exist with respect to other information-related torts 
should be considered, including the reverse engineering defense 
of trade secret law and the fair use defense of copyright law.163 
Indeed, it is such defenses which, in large part, prevent state 
information claims from conflicting too much with U.S. patent 
and copyright law and from being unconstitutional on First 
Amendment grounds. An additional defense may be fashioned 
relating to the nature and value of the information that was 
acquired, for instance, if the original source of the information 
was a public record. There is something odd and troubling about 
taxpayers paying for the collection and maintenance of public 
records, providing those public records to third-parties (usually 
for a modest price), and then paying for the enforcement of a 
third-party’s alleged rights to such information. Thus, in 
designing a wrongful acquisition tort, its remedies, and its 
defenses, the original source and nature of the subject 
information should matter. This should particularly be the case 
if the originator of the information who provided the information 
to the person or entity from whom it was “wrongfully acquired” 
does not care if the information is shared. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is possible to design a tort to deter acts of wrongful 
acquisition including cyber-hacking, but it is not easy. One 
reason for the difficulty is the need to distinguish such claims 
from existing information-related torts, such as copyright 
infringement and trade secret misappropriation, by adding extra 
elements to the proposed cause of action. Simply creating what 
amounts to a “lesser included” wrongful acquisition tort would 
risk undermining the balance between information protection 
and information diffusion that is reflected in existing U.S. 
patent, copyright, trade secret, and unfair competition law, and 
may be deemed preempted by federal patent and copyright law. 
Moreover, recognizing property-like rights with respect to wide 
swaths of information would likely quell the use of information 
that is part of the public domain and hamper invention and 
                                                          
 163. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2017); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 
AMENDMENTS § 1 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985) (stating that reverse 
engineering is a “proper means” of acquiring a trade secret). See generally 
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 114, §§ 734–41 (discussing the requirements for a 
number of torts relating to unfair competition and intellectual property). 
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competition. As experience with the CFAA has shown, it is 
difficult to fashion laws to preclude the alleged wrongful 
acquisition of information without putting legitimate uses of 
information at risk. Thus, given the importance of the free-flow 
of information and knowledge to our society and economy, 
including it being the key to invention and creativity, it may be 
that we should simply learn to tolerate the gaps in the law that 
currently exist and instead enjoy the rewards that come from the 
dissemination and sharing of unprotected information. The fact 
that a robust wrongful acquisition (or misappropriation) tort has 
not already developed, even since Christopher, strongly suggests 
that such a policy choice has already been made. 
